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We deliver one month’s average profit to a randomly selected
group of female microenterprise owners in the Kenyan slum of Dan-
dora, just preceding with the exponential growth of COVID-19 cases.
Firm profit, inventory spending, and food expenditures all increase.
The transfers simultaneously cause a re-opening of previously closed
businesses. PPE spending and precautionary management practices
increase to mitigate this effect, but only among those who perceive
COVID-19 as a major health risk. Cash transfers can assist in eco-
nomic stabilization during a pandemic, but the resulting increase in
business activity requires policies to inform and encourage mitiga-
tion.
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1 Introduction
As the coronavirus pandemic spread around the world in 2020, countries in-
stituted measures to stop the spread of the virus and replace lost income from
shutdown orders and the broader economic contraction. One group at par-
ticular risk is small businesses. In addition to making up the majority of
employment in many developing countries (Gollin, 2008), these firms tend to
operate in “non-essential” sectors and rely heavily on face-to-face interactions,
leaving them vulnerable due to the particular features of the COVID-19 shock
(Alfaro et al., 2020). In response, short-term unconditional cash transfers have
emerged as a critical tool to support the poor in developing countries. As of
June 2020, 191 countries have initiated some form of cash transfers to combat
the COVID-19 crisis (Gentilini et al., 2020). While intuitively appealing, em-
pirical evidence on the effectiveness of these programs is nearly non-existent.1
In this paper, we implement a randomized controlled trial to study the
benefits of a one-time unconditional cash transfer (UCT) to a particularly
vulnerable group: female microenterprise owners in Kenyan slum of Dandora,
on the outskirts of Nairobi. In our sample, average profit was about 2 USD
per day in January, but fell to about 1 USD per day by May following the
emergence of COVID-19 cases and subsequent government lockdowns in Kenya
that began in March.2
We randomly divide these business owners into a treatment group that
receives 5000 KES (≈ 50 USD, equal to approximately 1 month of average
profit in January 2020 among our sample) and a control group that receives 500
1The closest available evidence to our knowledge includes Banerjee et al. (2020b), who study how those
enrolled in an existing universal basic income RCT in rural Kenya experience the COVID-19 crisis differently
from those who were not enrolled. While an important study to understand how UBI buffers against shocks,
the interpretation of such ongoing transfers is different than the one-time infusions being suggested as short-
run stabilization policy. In a different vein, Bottan et al. (2020) study how the older individuals (around
age 60) in Bolivia respond to additional cash delivered through the pension system.
2In addition to the aforementioned risk faced by microenterprise owners, both cross-country and Kenyan
evidence points to the particular burden borne by women during this crisis (Alon et al., 2020a; Population
Council, 2020). The well-studied link between household and business decisions implies that such negative
businesses consequences will simultaneously impact household welfare. Recent studies of such gendered dis-
tortions in “normal” times include Hardy and Kagy (2018) and Bernhardt et al. (2019), while Jayachandran
(2020) provides a review.
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KES (≈ 5 USD) to cover mobile costs and time for participation. The ubiquity
of mobile money – already a key aspect of informal social insurance networks
(Jack and Suri, 2014) – allowed us to quickly deliver the treatment without
any in-person meetings and before the rise of infections. While there were 700
cumulative cases in Kenya when we completed delivery of the transfers on May
12, there were 1,286 two weeks later (World Health Organization, 2020). In
addition to our baseline in January 2020 from which we drew our sample, we
also gathered data continuously from April through August as the coronavirus
pandemic expanded along with corresponding policy responses.
Our results show the economic promise of such a policy, but also suggest
some caution is warranted as businesses respond to the treatment by operat-
ing more intensively. In terms of the economic benefits, we find that business
profits increase by 38 percent relative to the control. This restores approx-
imately one-third of the decline in profit we observe between January and
May.3 Household food expenditures also rise by 7 percent. Some of the gains
are re-invested in the business, as we see a large rise in inventory spending
among treated firms.
At the same time, however, we find little evidence that the treatment
generates a “shut down as a luxury” effect that has been raised in both policy
and the popular press (e.g. Glassman et al., 2020). On average, treatment
firms are 5 percentage points more likely to be open and remain open an
additional half hour per day. This average increase is driven by a massive
re-opening of firms that had temporarily closed due to COVID-19. A firm
that had temporarily closed was 65 percentage points more likely to be open
if treated. Thus, there seems to be a non-trivial tradeoff between economic
and public health benefits via reduced interpersonal interaction that must be
considered when designing policy among the poor.4
3This is in addition to the direct increase in resources from the transfer itself
4We do not attempt to quantify the optimal tradeoff of these forces within the context of our RCT,
as our inability to work on the ground in Dandora eliminated our ability to collect the relevant health
and interaction metrics. These moments would be required to credibly estimate the properly-modified SIR
model that would be required to study the overall welfare change induced by this tradeoff. See Alvarez et al.
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We find that this potential public health risk may be mitigated by an
increase in spending on PPE and adoption of protective measures within the
treatment group. Treatment caused PPE spending to increase by more than
22 percent on average, and caused an index of mitigation practices (such as
hand washing and mask wearing) to increase by 0.24 standard deviations.
This suggests that treated entrepreneurs were proactive in taking measures
to protect themselves and their customers. However, these effects were not
universal. Owners who believed the coronavirus no more deadly than the
seasonal flu were significantly less likely to engage in these mitigation measures,
and we see no change in their mitigation behavior relative to control. This
suggests a potentially important complementarity between cash transfers and
information campaigns such as Banerjee et al. (2020a) to minimize health risk
without stifling the social insurance benefits of cash transfers.
2 Economic Impact of COVID-19 in Dandora
Dandora is a dense, urban slum in Nairobi, with 150,000 residents. It is the
site of a sprawling 30 acre trash dump that services all of Nairobi despite being
declared full in 2001, and its pollution plays a major role in poor health and
respiratory issues among its residents (Kimani, 2007). This, along with the
density of Dandora and surrounding slums, lead to substantial anxiety that
COVID-19 would spread quickly among its residents. In response to the first
confirmed case in Kenya on March 13, 2020, the government instituted a series
of measures designed to limit personal interactions.5 As in many countries,
density played an important role in spread – as of the government’s most
recent update, 59 percent of all cases were in Nairobi county (Kenya Ministry
of Health, 2020).
(forthcoming) and Acemoglu et al. (2020) among many others for theoretical and quantitative evaluations
of such tradeoffs in rich countries, and Alon et al. (2020b) in developing countries.
5On March 15, a curfew and travel ban were simultaneously announced. All bars and restaurants, net
of takeaway, on March 22. On April 6, movement into and out of Nairobi was suspended for 21 days.
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Our sample focuses on microenterprises operated by women in Dandora.
In addition to making up the majority of small businesses in Dandora, quali-
tative survey evidence shows women bearing the brunt of the economic impact
in Dandora and other slums surrounding Nairobi (Population Council, 2020).
Combined with the fact that these female-run microenterprises are substan-
tially less profitable than those run by men (Brooks et al., 2018), this suggests
a particular vulnerability to such an economic downturn among Dandoran
women.
2.1 Economic Contraction
The COVID-19 shock and associated government response was felt across
Kenya, including Dandora. Figure 1 detail the time series of profit observed
in our control group, along with what we observed four years earlier in April
2016 among a similar set of female-run microenterprises in Dandora (Brooks
et al., 2018). We find that average profit declines by 47 percent between Jan-
uary and late April 2020. This is 57 percent lower than what we observed four
years earlier in April 2016 despite the fact that profit in late 2014 and 2019
seem quite similar. Thus, these Dandoran microenterprise owners are not im-
mune to the substantial downturn induced by the combination of COVID-19
uncertainty and government-imposed restrictions on movement and trade.
The results are consistent with the expectations and qualitative responses
observed at baseline. Eighteen percent of our sample had closed their busi-
nesses between January and May 2020 at least temporarily, while 47 percent
expected the COVID-19 crisis to shut down their business at some point at
least temporarily.
2.2 Policy Response and (Lack of) Reach into Dandora
To help mitigate the oncoming health and economic crises induced by COVID-
19, the Kenyan government simultaneously implemented a number of policies
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designed to partially stabilize incomes and reduce health risk. This included
tax relief to the poorest earners and a reduction of income tax in mid-March.
As of April 1, the government suspended of listing of negative credit informa-
tion with the Credit Reference Bureau of any person or micro or small business
with an overdue loan, along with a decrease in the VAT rate from 16 to 14
percent.
These policies primarily cater to the formal economy, providing little relief
to many of the most vulnerable microenterprises and households. In our base-
line survey, only 17 percent of business owners had received any government
relief by May 2020, a function of the limited connection to the formal economy.
Few, for example, utilize the formal loan market or pay taxes. Similarly, there
is little NGO reach into Dandora. Ninety-five percent of our sample received
no help from any NGO (no one mentions cash transfers, in particular). These
numbers remain roughly constant among the control group throughout the
study period ending August 2020.
Thus, our study takes place among a population that is among the most
vulnerable to such an economic downturn and faces a substantial contraction
in profit. Yet, at the same time, there is little relief from either the government
or NGOs. This allows us to study the impact of such a UCT policy in the
absence of existing stabilization policy that may impact our estimates.
2.3 COVID-19 Beliefs and Preventative Measures
We finally asked a series of questions designed to quantify entrepreneur un-
derstanding of and responses to the outbreak. Nearly 55 of our sample believe
the mortality risk of COVID-19 to be similar to that of ebola, while 20 percent
believed it to be less deadly than the flu. Such beliefs are reflected in some
business practices – over 80 percent of business owners wear a mask during
work and a similar fraction use hand sanitizer while working. Other practices
– limiting cash transitions, transitioning to takeaway service, or wearing gloves
5
are more limited. We provide a full breakdown of these baseline practices in
the Appendix.
3 Data Collection and Experimental Design
From October 2019 to January 2020, we had been conducting a cross-sectional
survey of 4,500 female-run microenterprises in Dandora for a separate research
study. As COVID-19 began to spread around the world, we drew a sample from
this baseline to study the importance of a quick and one-time cash injection as
a response to the economic downturn. We selected 800 women to be part of the
study. 753 were successfully enrolled into treatment (367) and control (386).
We then collected continuous surveys starting April 23, 2020 through August
11, 2020. Once each business owner was contacted (or called a maximum
of 4 times with no response), the call list was re-randomized to limit the
likelihood of bias in the timing of contact. All surveys were conducted by
trained enumerators via phone.
The transfers were delivered in the first two weeks of May 2020 by mobile
money (M-PESA). Treated individuals were made aware of their status the day
after the completion of their baseline survey response. The treatment group
received 5000 KES and the control group received 500 KES (as compensation
for surveys and air time required to answer). The scale of the treatment
transfers was designed to be approximately equal to one month of average
profit among our sample as observed in January 2020.
To summarize this timeline, Figure 2 overlays our data collection and
cash delivery timeline with the daily cumulative cases in Kenya from the
World Health Organization COVID-19 Dashboard (World Health Organiza-
tion, 2020). Two things are worth noting. First, we observe all business owners
twice before the delivery of the treatment – once in January before COVID-19
and the associated government response and again in late April or early May
(after the government’s response, but before the substantial growth in cases).
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Our treatment similarly is delivered immediately preceding this high growth
rate period, and our data collection period covers the bulk of the run-up in
COVID-19 cases in Kenya.
We provide balance checks in the Appendix, and find no difference between
control and treatment groups along a number of dimensions. The joint F-test
p-value is 0.984 across 15 relevant baseline variables.
4 Empirical Results
Our regressions take the form
yit = α + βTit + θi + γt + εit (4.1)
where yit is some outcome for individual i at week t, Tit = 1 if i is treated
at week t, and θ and γ are individual and week fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the individual level. We focus on the continual data collection
from April – August 2020, though the results are robust to the inclusion of
the earlier baseline data from January 2020.
4.1 Economic and Business Impact of the UCT
Table 1 begins with business and expenditure outcomes. Panel A shows the
average effects. We observe a substantial increase in profit, revenues, and
inventory spending within the business. Profit increases by 40 percent relative
to the control average (p = 0.000). A different interpretation of this change
is that it recoups about one-third of the decline in profit we observe between
January and May. Some of these additional resources are re-invested into the
business in terms of higher inventory spending, which increases by 66 percent
(p = 0.000), while some is used for consumption, with food expenditures
increasing by 7 percent (p = 0.072).
Yet, the results show that the treatment also induces businesses to operate
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more intensively on average. Firms are 5 percentage points more likely to be
open (p = 0.046) and are open 0.55 hours more per day (p = 0.050). Thus, at
least in terms of average effects, the public health benefits do not necessarily
come “for free” wth the economic benefits.
Because of our survey and intervention timing, we can further study treat-
ment heterogeneity based on the scale of the initial COVID-induced shock.
We interact the treatment with an indicator for whether the business closed
between January and May. The results in Panel B highlight that these busi-
nesses fare differently. While there is some evidence that those who remained
open in May were able to shut down their stores in response to treatment, this
effect is swamped by the massive re-entry of closed businesses. Together with
the implied increase in hours, these results generate the increase in average
intensity of operation observed in Panel A.
Thus, the results show that the cash transfers are indeed effective as eco-
nomic stabilization in response to COVID-19. The results also suggest a ten-
sion with the public health goals of containing such a crisis in a context with
substantial poverty: those hit hardest by the COVID-19 shock pre-treatment
use the treatment to reopen their businesses. If the treatment simultaneously
induces businesses to take more public health-related precautions, this would
likely lower the public health concern of this increased operational intensity.
We return to this issue in Section 4.2 after further probing the rationale for
re-opening in Section 4.1.1.
4.1.1 Why Do Businesses Re-open?
To better understand the results of Panel B in Table 1, we use our January
and May data pre-treatment to study the initial shock to firms.
One important result from Table 1 is that food spending increases only
among those that remained open in May. Among those who remained open,
we observe a 9 percent increase in food expenditures (p = 0.049). The change
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among those who were closed in May is 36.95 KES, a 2 percent increase and
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
To study this result further, we begin by studying how inventory and profit
change before the treatment. Figure 3 shows average inventory expenditures
and profit in January and May, delineated by whether or not the firm is even-
tually closed in May. The first thing to note as that the two groups looks
similar in January along these margins. Second, there is a clear decline in
inventory expenditures and profit in both groups, though it is naturally more
pronounced among those that close by May.
The perhaps more surprising result is that despite the large decline in profit
among those who close, food expenditures look similar to those who do not.6
We cannot reject the null of equality between the two groups at conventional
levels of statistical significance.7
The rationale for this result is that at extreme levels of poverty, food con-
sumption is likely to be extremely income inelastic. We observe family-level
food expenditures around Ksh 2000 per week in May, or about Ksh 606 per
adult equivalent for a family of four (scaling two children at 0.65 an adult).
This puts our sample’s spending slightly below the food poverty line of Ksh
638 – the level that Kenyan government and World Bank estimate to be a
sustainable subsistence level of calories (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics,
2018).8
At such levels of poverty, lowering consumption would have dire conse-
quences, thus generating the low income elasticity we observe. Households
facing a negative shock must instead adjust by some other means. Here, this
takes the form of inventory adjustment. Put differently, the business itself
acts as the technology households use to move resources across time in re-
6We did not collect food expenditures in January, though it would be surprising if they were substantially
different across the two groups given the other results.
7In the cross-sectional regression 1[lower food expenditures]i = α + β1[closed in May]i + εi we find
α̂ = 0.622 (0.020) and β̂ = −0.017 (0.046), where standard errors are in parenthesis.
8The overall poverty line, which includes non-food expenditures, is Ksh 1499 per week for each adult-
equivalent.
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sponse to a negative shock when formal credit markets are unavailable. This
further helps rationale the results in Table 1. When exposed to the treatment,
these firms rebuilding their inventory (and thus see a larger treatment effect
as in Column 3, Panel B) at the expense of changing food consumption (as
in Column 4, Panel B). This point has similarly been raised in Jayachandran
(2006) and Fink et al. (2020) in response to weather and credit shocks, but
plays a critical role in interpreting the results and potential tradeoff between
economics and public health among the small, credit-constrained firms.
4.2 COVID-19 Preventative Measures
While the treatment induces firms to re-open, firms may also use the cash to
adopt more sanitary practices to mitigate virus spread. We therefore study
whether the treatment induces any change in spending on personal protective
equipment (PPE) or public health-related management practices. The latter
is an index of 9 practices related to safe business operation, measured as the
z-score.9
Columns (1) and (3) in Table 2 show the average effect on personal protec-
tive equipment (PPE) spending along with the management practices index.
We find that despite causing businesses to remain open and operate more
intensively, the treatment also causes them to increase protective measures
against the spread of COVID-19 while operating. PPE spending increases by
22 percent (p = 0.022), while our management practices index increases by
0.24 standard deviations above baseline mean (p = 0.010).
This effect, however, is not universal. Those who believe COVID-19 to have
lower mortality risk do not change their spending or practices. We interact the
treatment with an indicator for the baseline belief that the mortality COVID-
19 is no greater than the seasonal flu. These results are in columns (2) and
9We construct an index of these practices by counting the number implemented and normalizing by
baseline levels. Specifically, we construct the z-score for individual i at time t as (
∑9
j=1 1ijt−µ0)/σ0, where
1ijt = 1 if individual i implemented practice j at week t and the mean and standard deviation are from
baseline responses. See the Appendix for more details and a breakdown of adoption of various practices at
baseline.
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(4) of Table 2. Among those with low perceived risk, the interaction term
has the opposite sign and similar magnitude to the treatment variable. The
net effect is that those with low beliefs of COVID-19 severity do not change
preventative practices, while those with a higher assessment increase PPE
spending and public health-related management practices.
The results highlight the importance of beliefs in managing the relationship
between economic and public health during short-run stabilization policy. This
suggests important complementary between information interventions (such
as those proposed and studied in Barnett-Howell and Mobarak (2020) and
Banerjee et al. (2020a)). Together, such a suite of policy adjustments may
be able to induce safer re-opening without eliminating the economic gains
generated by the UCT.
4.3 Discussion and Other Outcomes
Our results show that there substantial impacts from an unconditional cash
transfer. However, there is both little existing evidence on how such a transfer
impacts microenterprise owners and many hypotheses on how it should. In
the Appendix, we therefore study heterogeneity along a number of different
dimensions that may play a role.
First, we study whether household characteristics – whether the woman
is married, is the head of household, her age, and number of children – gen-
erate variation in the treatment effect. Bernhardt et al. (2019), for example,
shows how these types of characteristics may impact outcomes. We find no
statistically significant evidence that these characteristics generate differential
treatment effects. We then consider heterogeneity by type of business, as cer-
tain types of businesses are more likely to be hurt by the COVID-19 shock.
We find no differential effects. We emphasize however that this is likely a func-
tion of the types of businesses that are most common in Dandora. Like most
slums, our sample is dominated by retail (either directly, or combined with
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own-production of goods such as furniture or clothes) and restaurants. Thus,
the same heterogeneity highlighted in more diversified economies is unlikely to
be found here.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides new experimental evidence on the impact of a one-time
cash transfer during a severe global downturn. We utilize mobile money to
deliver these transfers to female micro-entrepreneurs in Dandora, Kenya, a
group that was both particularly vulnerable to the economic consequences of
the COVID-19 pandemic and received little assistance from the government
and NGOs.
Our results show that UCTs have their intended effect of helping people
maintain their livelihoods. Profit increases by 38 percent, making up approx-
imately one-third of the decline observed during the initial shutdown imple-
mented by the Kenyan government, while simultaneously increasing inventory
and food consumption. However, we further show that caution is warranted
when implementing such a policy. The cash transfer substantially increases
the likelihood of a closed business re-opening, which induces an overall increase
in the operating hours. This effect works potentially works against the goal
of reducing interpersonal interaction to curtail virus spread, and policymakers
must balance these competing economic and public health forces. A key input
into this tradeoff is mitigation efforts, and we find that firms increase health-
safety management practices while increasing PPE spending. Since we find
that beliefs play an important role in affecting mitigation efforts, there may
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Month
Figure notes: This figure traces out average control group profit by month in our study, and
compares it to time series of profit from a similar sample of female-run microenterprises in
Dandora collected in 2014-2016 (from Brooks et al., 2018). Surveys began April 23, 2020,
so the April 2020 data point should be interpreted as the last week of April 2020.
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Data collection Cash delivery
Figure notes: This figure plots cumulative COVID-19 cases in Kenya at a daily frequency
from World Health Organization (2020) beginning on January 3, 2020. It further includes
our data collection periods (shaded area) and cash delivery date (dashed line).
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Inventory Profit Food Spending
January 2020 May 2020
Figure notes: This figure plots average inventory spending in January and May 2020, along
with food expenditures in May 2020. It delineates firms by whether or not they were open in
May 2020. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are included. Vertical axis is measured
in Kenyan shillings.
18
Table 1: Economic and Business Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A: Profit Revenue Inventory Food Open Daily
OUTCOMES Expenditures Expenditures Hours
Treat 315.381*** 744.372*** 1,098.363*** 154.291* 0.053** 0.545*
(72.165) (216.005) (228.128) (85.709) (0.027) (0.278)
Observations 4,046 3,996 3,997 4,019 4,112 4,052
R-squared 0.021 0.019 0.021 0.014 0.013 0.025
Ind FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Control Average 785.7 2567 1663 2063 0.829 6.931
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL B: Profit Revenue Inventory Food Open Daily
OUTCOMES Expenditures Expenditures Hours
Treat 234.309*** 591.776** 993.137*** 178.686** -0.073*** -0.375
(77.166) (230.622) (245.989) (90.587) (0.021) (0.264)
Treat × Closed 459.672*** 884.806** 601.642** -141.733 0.738*** 5.235***
(116.312) (379.292) (255.576) (144.870) (0.052) (0.497)
Observations 4,001 3,952 3,952 3,973 4,066 4,006
R-squared 0.025 0.021 0.022 0.015 0.103 0.064
Ind FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Control Average (Open) 898.1 2927 1890 2091 0.913 7.767
Control Average (Closed) 301.3 968.4 647.2 1965 0.464 3.365
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Continuous variables trimmed at 1 percent.
Control averages taken over entire time period of study.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: Economic and Business Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OUTCOMES PPE PPE Protective Protectives
spending spending measures measures
(z-score) (z-score)
Treat 44.973** 60.115** 0.239** 0.286***
(19.639) (20.824) (0.082) (0.090)
Treat x Low Perception of Risk -72.511** -0.273**
(31.410) (0.114)
Observations 4,073 4,037 4,112 4,066
R-squared 0.079 0.082 0.045 0.047
Ind FE Y Y Y Y
Control Average 204.1 204.1 0.182 0.182
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Spending trimmed
at 1 percent. Protective measures is the standardized z-score of 9 management
practices designed to limit COVID-19 spread.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A Additional Results
A.1 COVID-19 Beliefs and Management Practices at Baseline































































Figure notes: This figure is a histogram of the answer to the question “For an average person
in good health, how serious a threat does the coronavirus pose to their health?” in late April
and early May 2020 (before treatment). The number in parenthesis is the approximate
average death rate per 5000 untreated individuals, which was given to respondents as part
of their choices.
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Figure 5: COVID-Related Protective Measures at Work
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Figure notes: Baseline responses in May 2020 on measures undertaken to limit COVID



















Hours open 0.150 6.477∗∗∗
(0.289) (0.202)
Number of employees 0.00380 0.179∗∗∗
(0.0392) (0.0274)
Any employee 0.000420 0.126∗∗∗
(0.0245) (0.0170)
Any loan 0.0246 0.242∗∗∗
(0.0687) (0.0479)
Loan amount -5.628 201.8∗∗∗
(69.00) (48.17)
Personal and Household Characteristics
Age 0.492 39.47∗∗∗
(0.706) (0.493)




Number of children -0.0335 2.927∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.0763)
Years of schooling 0.275 10.28∗∗∗
(0.786) (0.549)
Food Spending -17.99 2112.2∗∗∗
(91.11) (63.61)
Observations 753
Joint F-test, p-value 0.984
Results from a regression of yi = α+ βTi + εi run on baseline data, where Ti = 1 if eventually treated.
All results are from the April/May 2020 survey wave, except Age through Years of Schooling,
which were collected in the initial baseline in late 2019/early 2020. Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.3 Treatment Effect by Household Composition
Table 4: Household Composition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INTERACTED Head of Married Age No. of
CHARACTERISTIC Household Children
Treat 279.673*** 403.318*** 520.015** 345.303**
(99.924) (99.545) (250.487) (139.583)
Treat × 64.661 -135.632 -4.919 -9.637
HH Char (108.884) (108.353) (5.832) (36.816)
Observations 4,042 4,042 4,028 4,042
R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
Ind FE Y Y Y Y
Control Average 848.3 848.3 848.3 848.3
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
Outcome in all columns is profit trimmed at 1 percent.
Columns vary the interacted characteristic.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A.4 Treatment Effect by Business Type






Treat × Production 85.880
(189.974)
Treat × Service Provider 2.393
(123.721)
Treat × Restaurant -22.057
(172.743)






Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
Outcome in all columns is profit trimmed at 1 percent.
Columns vary the interacted characteristic.
Baseline business type is retail.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B Robustness
B.1 Headline Results with ANCOVA specification
Table 6 reproduces the headline results in the main text. The results are similar, with lower p-values for some. The only
outcome that becomes statistically insignificant at standard cutoffs is the index of health safety measures, in which the
p-value increases to p = 0.115.
Table 6: ANCOVA Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OUTCOMES Profit Revenue Inventory Food Open Hours PPE Protective measures
Expenditures Expenditures Open Spending (z-score)
Treat 246.701*** 635.509*** 550.914*** 179.891*** 0.050*** 0.525*** 22.170*** 0.054
(56.402) (176.519) (146.779) (56.531) (0.017) (0.194) (10.571) (0.034)
Observations 3,216 3,167 3,159 3,169 3,312 3,213 2,322 2,946
R-squared 0.135 0.178 0.108 0.120 0.117 0.126 0.082 0.054
Ind FE N N N N N N N N
Control Average 771.4 2534 1637 2074 0.829 6.886 245.1 0.188
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Continuous variables trimmed at 1 percent.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C Construction of Empirical Moments
C.1 Public Health Management Practices
The 9 practices included in our index are: (1) use hand santizer while working,
(2) wear globes while handling money, (3) only use mobile money, no cash,
(4) do not interact directly with customers, (5) customers must pick up their
orders and leave immediately, (6) started a delivery service, (7) enforce social
distancing, (8) wear a mask, (9) ask customers to wash hands before entering.
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